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Note
Drilling and Community Consent: How Oil and
Gas Boards Can Address the Public Health
Threats Posed by Fracking
Ellie Bastian∗
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, an international shale gas developer requested a
permit to drill an exploratory well near the sleepy town of Belfry,
Montana,1 population 218. 2 Local citizens’ organizations demanded a hearing.3 Ten people spoke against the exploratory
well, including a nearby organic farmer, a registered nurse, a
goat raiser, and an environmental geologist. 4 After taking these
comments into consideration, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas
granted a permit to the company. 5 In effect, that permit not only
entitled the company to drill an exploratory well, but also to proceed with any subsequent well development—including, for ex-

∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota. Thank you to Professor
Ann Burkhart for her constructive advice on each revision of this Note. Thank
you to the many members of Minnesota Law Review who helped polish and
shape my writing. Thank you, finally, to the experts and practitioners who
kindly responded to my research inquiries. Copyright © 2017 by Ellie Bastian.
1. Appellants’/Plaintiffs’ Response Brief at 1, Carbon Cty. Res. Council v.
Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016) (No. DA 150613).
2. U.S. Census Bureau, Belfry CDP, Montana Population, AMERICAN
FACTFINDER (2010), https://www.factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/
community_facts.xhtml (search in the search bar for “Belfry, CDP Montana”).
3. Appellee’s Answer Brief at 5, Carbon Cty. Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of
Oil & Gas Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016) (No. DA 15-0613).
4. Id. at 7.
5. Id. at 9. The Board included one of the geologist’s suggested mitigation
measures, requiring the company to adhere to a certain standard for water management (“should hydraulic fracturing be used”), as one of the conditions of receiving the permit. Id.
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ample, hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and wastewater procedures—without any additional notification to the public.6 After
that initial hearing, the oil company’s remaining civic obligation
was to inform the Board at least forty-eight hours before using
any “completion treatment” not mentioned in the permit. 7
This policy is problematic. Drilling for oil and gas is an inherently risky endeavor, both for those working in the industry
and those living nearby. 8 Fracking and its associated
wastewaters have been blamed for causing earthquakes, polluting the air, and polluting ground and surface water. 9 To frack,
petroleum companies shoot a mixture of water and chemicals
into the ground.10 This toxic wastewater comes back up with the
gas and must be dealt with one way or another—for example, by
storing it in a pit. 11 But such a practice does not ensure safety:
“[o]ften these pits are unlined. . . . [and] even if they are lined,
the liners can tear and contaminate soil and possibly groundwater with toxic chemicals.” 12
As it turns out, the citizens of Belfry were lucky even to be
able to demand a hearing about the exploratory well permit. 13
6. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n at 9, Carbon Cty.
Res. Council v. Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 380 P.3d 798 (Mont. 2016)
(No. DA 15-0613).
7. See id. (explaining that when companies fill out permit applications for
exploratory wells, they cannot know in advance whether “completion treatments” like hydraulic fracturing, acidizing, or chemical stimulation will be required—which is why the forty-eight-hour rule is helpful).
8. See Ivan Penn, “We Cannot Breathe:” A Poor Alabama Town Has Lived
with the Rotten Egg Stench of Gas for 8 Years, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016), http://
www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-eight-mile-leak; Monte Whaley & John Ingold,
Drilling Through Danger, DENV. POST (Sept. 25, 2016), http://extras.denverpost
.com/oil-gas-deaths (“In the oil field, there is a kaleidoscope of ways workers can
die.”).
9. See K. M. Keranen et al., Sharp Increase in Central Oklahoma Seismicity Since 2008 Induced by Massive Wastewater Injection, 345 SCIENCE 448, 448–
51 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 180–97 (2013); American Lung Association Gives
Sublette County an ‘F ’ for Ozone Pollution, ENVT’L. DEF. FUND (Apr. 25,
2013), https://www.edf.org/news/american-lung-association-gives-sublette
-county-‘f ’-ozone-pollution.
10. See What Is Fracking and Why Is It Controversial?, BBC (Dec. 16, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-14432401.
11. See Hydraulic Fracturing 101, EARTHWORKS, https://www
.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/hydraulic_fracturing_101 (last visited Oct.
13, 2017).
12. Id.
13. For example, citizens in Colorado do not have the option of a public
hearing before a drilling operation commences, while those in Texas can request
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More often, oil and gas companies are not subject to any formal
protest. 14 Instead, they obtain the proper permits from the state
agency and proceed with whatever additional phases of drilling
seem appropriate for that location, obtaining additional permits
if necessary.15 Nearby property owners cannot act preemptively
to, for example, make anticipatory nuisance claims. 16 It is only
much later, if actual harm occurs and is documented, that a
nearby property owner can file a lawsuit and potentially recover
damages.17
This Note argues that most state oil and gas boards do not
provide adequate protections to the public. 18 People living near
petroleum drilling operations should be entitled to a greater role
in the decision-making process. This is especially true for adjacent property owners, whose land and even personal health
could potentially be immediately affected by the proposed drilling activity. Although open meeting laws like those in Montana
do allow citizens to voice their concerns, making a statement at
a little-publicized hearing is not enough.
Part I of this Note conducts an overview of the drilling process and its associated public health concerns. It then compares
the hearing and notice regimes of various state-level oil and gas
boards, using Montana and Colorado as case studies. This Part
demonstrates that the procedures in those two states provide
greater safeguards to the public than most other petroleum-producing states. Part II contends that the oil and gas boards of
a hearing only if they meet the narrow “protested application” requirements.
See infra Part I.B, Table 1.
14. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY, THE LAW OF FRACKING § 6:5 (Westlaw
2016) (“When the permit is issued, no public notice is required in most states,
so the fact of state permission is only made public when the drillers arrive to
begin work on the site preparations.”).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 14:5.
17. See, e.g., EMMETT ENVTL. LAW & POLICY CLINIC, HARVARD LAW SCH., A
LANDOWNER’S GUIDE TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 2 (2014), http://blogs.harvard
.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/2014/08/ELPC-Fracking-Leasing-Guide
-UPDATED-July-2014_booklet-2-page-view.pdf (“[N]o lease can completely prevent harm . . . . [R]emember that it is impossible to eliminate all risk, no matter
what terms you include in your lease.”) (emphasis omitted). See generally
O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 14:5 (comparing how juries in different cases have
responded to damage claims for nuisance, typically considering loss of market
value for property, the cost of repairs, and other general damages for inconvenience, discomfort, or annoyance). Of course, the property owners who decided to
lease their land for oil and gas extraction could themselves be harmed.
18. This Note generally refers to such agencies as oil and gas boards,
though the agencies also go by other titles, such as commissions or divisions.
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most states, as they are currently designed, do not provide adequate protections to the public—particularly to adjacent property owners.
Part III suggests that protections should be strengthened by
(1) requiring mandatory public forums for all exploratory wells
outside of an existing field; and (2) mandating direct notice of
those forums, by mail, to adjacent property owners. Furthermore, oil and gas boards should have at least one member with
a background in ecology or wildlife biology, and one member with
a background in public health. Finally, each oil and gas board
should establish an epidemiological monitoring program to oversee pollution at all drilling fields in their state. These recommendations have drawbacks, including hamstringing the petroleum
industry to a greater degree than it has become accustomed. But,
they would strengthen the rights of those who must live with the
consequences of industrial activity, long after the drilling is
done.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DRILLING PROCESS, ITS
ASSOCIATED HEALTH THREATS, AND THE AGENCIES
THAT GOVERN IT ALL
Oil and natural gas have been called “the engine of the world
economy.” 19 Together, they account for over half of humanity’s
primary energy supply.20 Some say “our world would almost
grind to a halt without oil.” 21 In 2016, natural gas surpassed coal
as the leading fuel for electricity generation in the United
States. 22 As the industry has grown and made itself indispensable, states have had to contend with how to regulate and monitor
its activity. This Part presents an overview of the segment of the

19. Maizar Rahman, Indonesian Governor for OPEC, Speech at the Tenth
International Financial and Economic Forum: Oil and Gas: The Engine of the
World Economy (Nov. 10, 2004), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/900.htm.
20. Ryan Carlyle, What Are the Top Five Facts Everyone Should Know
About Oil Exploration?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
quora/2013/04/03/what-are-the-top-five-facts-everyone-should-know-about-oil
-exploration.
21. David Winder, The Importance of Oil in Our World Today, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 31, 1983), https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0131/013137
.html.
22. John Wihbey, Pros and Cons of Fracking: Research Updates, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (June 6, 2017), http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/
2017/06/pros-and-cons-of-fracking-research-updates.
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petroleum industry pertinent to this Note: the extraction of onshore natural gas on private land in the United States. 23 Fracking, a technique for extracting such natural gas, is now happening in twenty-one states across the nation, 24 with others like
Alaska 25 and Illinois 26 likely joining soon. This activity is primarily regulated through state common law and through the enabling acts that charge oil and gas boards with the authority to
grant and oversee the permit process.27 Section A gives a brief
history of drilling for oil and gas. It discusses the potential public
health and environmental hazards associated with the modern
petroleum industry. Section B examines the enabling acts of
state-level oil and gas boards and compares the ways various
states have chosen to design them, focusing primarily on the enhanced protections that Montana and Colorado offer.
A. THE DRILLING PROCESS AND ITS POTENTIAL HAZARDS
The relationship between humans and petroleum spans
thousands of years.28 People living in ancient Mesopotamia used
petroleum products to coat their floors and light their homes. 29
In 1821, the first natural gas well was drilled, followed by a rudimentary form of fracking by the end of that century. 30 Only in
the 1990s were modern fracking techniques developed. 31 While
23. Though petroleum and oil are sometimes used interchangeably, this
Note refers to petroleum as an umbrella term encompassing both oil and natural gas. See Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/
tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=P#petro (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Petroleum: A
broadly defined class . . . . Included are crude oil, . . . refined products obtained
from the processing of crude oil, and natural gas plant liquids.”).
24. See Zahra Hirji & Lisa Song, Map: The Fracking Boom, State by State,
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.insideclimatenews.org/
news/20150120/map-fracking-boom-state-state.
25. See Alex DeMarban, Explorer Plans First Test of Fracking Potential in
North Slope Shale, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.adn
.com/business-economy/energy/2017/04/23/explorer-plans-first-test-of-oil
-potential-in-prudhoe-bay-shale.
26. See Illinois’ First Fracking Permit Reignites Controversy, U.S. NEWS
(June 26, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/illinois/articles/
2017-06-26/illinois-first-fracking-permit-reignites-controversy.
27. See LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 231 (2015);
O’REILLY, supra note 14.
28. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 27, at 115.
29. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY TRANSITIONS: HISTORY, REQUIREMENTS, PROSPECTS 33 (2010).
30. DAVID E. NEWTON, FRACKING 317–18 (2015).
31. See Stacey Vanek Smith, How an Engineer ’s Desperate Experiment Created Fracking, NPR (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/27/
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oil dominates the transportation sector, natural gas is key for
heating homes and for electricity production.32 This Section first
discusses the modern process of extracting petroleum. It then
examines the concomitant environmental and human health
hazards.
1. Petroleum and the Basic Steps of Petroleum Extraction

Petroleum, which is a material made up of pressurized remains of ancient sea life, is found within shale formations
throughout the world. 33 It comes in various forms, including oil
and natural gas. 34 Oil is found in underground reservoirs—a
misnomer since the oil is not pooled like a sea, but is rather
trapped as tiny droplets in rocks.35 It is recovered through drilled
wells, and then refined to be converted into usable fuels.36 Similar to oil deposits, natural gas migrates underground until it becomes trapped in an area with the proper geologic makeup: porous reservoir rock capped by an impenetrable rock. 37 The word
fracking refers to the processes that make up this newer phenomenon of high-volume hydraulic fracturing. 38 Drillers searching for natural gas use fracking to create fissures in tight underground shale formations with low permeability.39 These fissures
allow the gas—otherwise inaccessible—to flow to the surface
through the injected pipe. 40 By the 1990s and 2000s, the innovations of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing
changed the natural gas landscape: (1) companies could drill in
places previously inaccessible; and (2) companies realized they

495671385/how-an-engineers-desperate-experiment-created-fracking (explaining the inception of high-volume hydraulic fracturing).
32. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 27, at 118, 125.
33. See Jeffrey J. Brown, General Characteristics of Shale Plays, in THE
SHALE ENERGY REVOLUTION: A LAWYER ’S GUIDE 1–2 (Sarah Casey ed., 2015).
34. Id.
35. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FOSSIL ENERGY STUDY GUIDE: OIL, 1 (2013),
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/HS_Oil_Studyguide_draft2.pdf.
36. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 27, at 116.
37. See Brown, supra note 33, at 2–3.
38. See Hirji & Song, supra note 24.
39. See generally Hydraulic Fracturing 101, supra note 11 (explaining the
process of hydraulic fracturing and associated issues). This method is utilized
for both oil and natural gas. Brown, supra note 33, at 3.
40. JESSICA SMARTT GULLION, FRACKING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RELUCTANT ACTIVISTS AND NATURAL GAS DRILLING 39–40 (2015). For additional information about the process of natural gas extraction, see id. at 39–46.
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could supplement the chemical mixtures 41 with millions of gallons of water per well, 42 making the endeavor more cost-effective. 43
It is not always easy for petroleum companies to find a reservoir of oil or natural gas that will be cost-effective to drill. 44 In
order for companies to find new production fields, they must engage in exploratory drilling.45 A diagnostic fracture injection
test, or DFIT, can be used to “test a well’s reservoir pressure before it is productive.” 46 It is possible to conduct a DFIT using only
water, but it is more common to supplement the water with a
chemical like potassium chloride. 47 If the tests indicate that a
particular location will not be sufficiently productive, the well
will be abandoned.48 If the tests indicate that it is worthwhile to
prepare the vertical hole for production, then the company will
commence the completion process.49 Drilling rigs run around the

41. See AM. ENTER. INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: UNLOCKING AMERNATURAL GAS RESOURCES 8 (2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/files/
policy/exploration/hydraulic_fracturing_primer.ashx (describing the purpose
and common application of ten fracking chemicals, comparing them to laundry
detergent and deodorant). But cf. Theo Colborn et al., An Exploratory Study of
Air Quality Near Natural Gas Operations, 20 HUMAN & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: AN INT’L J. 1, 98 (2014) (listing hazardous chemicals not mentioned
in the previous report, including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene, and
methane).
42. In 2015, the average amount of water used per well was 5.3 million gallons; the total nationwide from January 2011 to January 2016 was 358.4 billion
gallons. CERES, AN INVESTOR GUIDE TO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND WATER
STRESS 7 (2016), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/
68426/102904/125791/CERES_2016_An_Investor_Guide_to_Hydraulic_
Fracturing_and_Water_Stress.pdf.
43. See Smith, supra note 31 (“ The well fracked with water was almost
twice as productive as the gel-fracked well—twice as productive and half as expensive.”).
44. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 33, at 3 (“Large, economic reservoirs are
rare and increasingly hard to find. . . . Drilling [producing wells] is by far the
largest expense, running into the tens of millions of dollars per well.”).
45. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 4–
5.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 7.
48. See Brown, supra note 33, at 3 n.2 (“ The purpose of an exploratory well
is to identify and evaluate potentially productive formations, whereas production wells are optimized to extract petroleum most efficiently.”); see also Brief
of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 22 (describing a well
that was abandoned after performing the DFIT).
49. See generally Brown, supra note 33, at 8–10 (explaining the completion
process in detail).
ICA’S
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clock, with operating costs of $50,000 to $70,000 a day.50 During
this step, horizontal wells can be drilled off of the main vertical
one 51 and “well completion treatments,” like fracking, acidizing,
and other forms of chemical stimulation, can be used. 52 This production period brings the gas to the surface. But, coming up
alongside the gas is “produced water”—an estimated 858 billion
gallons each year. 53
This produced water, or wastewater, presents its own problems to drilling operators. Such water is contaminated not only
with petroleum, but with the chemicals that went into the well
during the fracking process, as well as heavy metals from beneath the earth’s surface. 54 Operators employ various methods
to deal with it; the most common are: (1) shooting it back underground into “injection wells”; 55 (2) putting it in “evaporation
ponds”; 56 or (3) reusing it for additional fracking. 57 If they choose
injection wells, operators must survey the sites carefully to ensure that the pressurized waste does not find its way to the surface again.58 They must truck the wastewater from the fracking
50. Mike Hughlett, North Dakota Oil Industry Shows Signs of a Rebound,
STAR TRIB. (June 3, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/north-dakota-oil
-industry-shows-signs-of-a-rebound/426170091.
51. See id. (“Each of the . . . wells will reach down 2 miles, then veer horizontally for another 2 miles, the signature pattern of shale oil fracking.”).
52. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 9.
53. Jonathan Thompson, Oil Gas and Water Use: The Real Issues, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/oil-and-gas
-water-use-the-real-issues.
54. Id. (“[Produced water] can be naturally tainted by . . . arsenic, a smorgasbord of heavy metals and even radiation.”).
55. For a discussion of this process, see O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16 (“An
injection well for driller wastes is basically a long vertical pipe with 24/7 diesel
pumps pushing downward relentlessly.”).
56. See David Hasemyer, Open Pits Offer Cheap Disposal for Fracking
Sludge, but Health Worries Mount, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 2, 2014),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/10/02/15826/open-pits-offer-cheap
-disposal-fracking-sludge-health-worries-mount (“A handful of states . . . allow
[wastewater] to be stored in open-air pits, called evaporation ponds[,] . . . where
it remains until it becomes a gooey sludge the consistency of cake batter. Then
it might be spread on open plots of land . . . [o]r it might remain in the pits until
they are filled and covered with dirt for permanent storage. Some waste may
also be mixed with asphalt and used to pave roads.”).
57. See id. (“After as much oil and gas as possible is removed from the water, it’s . . . used to frack new wells.”); Thompson, supra note 53 (mentioning
that some of the wastewater is recycled and used for irrigation). But see
O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16 (“Because of radium-226 and other radioactive
components deep in the shale layer, this liquid waste cannot readily be introduced into any useful on-surface water use.”).
58. See O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16.
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site to the site of the injection well—which may or may not be
nearby. 59 Wastewater spills from trucking accidents can contaminate other water sources. 60 Operators using evaporation pits
must figure out what to do with the toxic sludge that remains in
the pits after the liquid has evaporated, which totals roughly 1.2
barrels of solid waste for each foot drilled. 61 Some, though not
all, states require that evaporation pits be lined with material to
prevent seepage.62 If operators wish to reuse the wastewater,
they can implement on-site recycling technology. 63 This may be
cost-effective if the region has few injection wells. 64 Another reuse alternative is having the wastewater processed at a waste
treatment facility which then “dump[s] the ‘clean’ water into a
nearby sewer or river.” 65 Wastewater contains radioactive components. 66 The treated effluent and other byproducts are less radioactive than before treatment, but they are still radioactive. 67
Of course, the cheapest and simplest way to get rid of produced
water is to dump it on adjacent agricultural land. 68 The quantity
of wastewater can vary widely from one location to another—for
59. Nichola Groom, Fracking Water ’s Dirty Secret—Recycling, SCI. AM.,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/analysis-fracking-waters-dirty
-secret (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
60. See, e.g., Laura Arenschield, Truck Overturns, Spills Drilling
Wastewater That Taints Reservoir, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/03/09/Fracking-wastewater
-shuts-down-reservoir.html.
61. ICF CONSULTING, OVERVIEW OF EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
WASTE VOLUMES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES
22 (2000), http://www.api.org/~/media/files/ehs/environmental_performance/
icf-waste-survey-of-eandp-wastes-2000.pdf.
62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-156, ENERGY-WATER
NEXUS: INFORMATION ON THE QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER PRODUCED DURING OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION 28 (2012), http://www.gao
.gov/assets/590/587522.pdf (noting that Colorado generally does not require lining but Wyoming does).
63. See Groom, supra note 59.
64. Id. For example, the geology of the Marcellus Shale region in Pennsylvania makes injection wells less feasible there. Id. For that reason, the Marcellus Shale region reuses seventy percent of its wastewater. Bill Chameides,
Fracking Water: It’s Just So Hard To Clean, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: THE GREAT
ENERGY CHALLENGE (Oct. 4, 2013), http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/
2013/10/04/fracking-water-its-just-so-hard-to-clean.
65. Chameides, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Roy L. Hales, We Are Eating Drilling & Fracking Waste, THE ECOREPORT (May 13, 2015), http://theecoreport.com/we-are-eating-drilling-fracking
-waste.
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example, wells in parts of Montana produce, on average, sixteen
times more water than similar wells in parts of Colorado.69
A producing well will be abandoned when it is no longer active enough to be profitable. 70 In the absence of a strict regulatory regime, companies are often able to leave the wellhead site
behind without spending much money on waste site remediation.71 There is little requirement for companies to develop reclamation plans for the wellhead sites, and even less ability to
enforce such plans at either the federal or the state level. 72 This
means that certain aspects of drilling, like the wastewater and
its associated sludge, could remain a threat long after the well
has been abandoned. 73 The following Subsection addresses how
this threat affects the health of humans and the environment.
2. Potential Hazards for Human and Environmental Health
As mentioned in the previous Subsection, numerous toxic
inputs and byproducts are an inherent part of the fracking process. These byproducts can have a negative impact on the health
of various species who happen to be living nearby, 74 including
humans. Oil and gas operations pollute the air with more than
nine million tons of methane and other chemicals each year. 75
This has contributed to an increase in asthma, especially among
children and the elderly 76—which is disturbing, since 650,000
69. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 11.
70. See O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 6:16. However, it may not be abandoned
forever; new fracking techniques could allow companies to refracture the same
wells at a later date. See Amy Dalrymple, New Technology Could Recover More
Oil from Early Bakken Wells, BISMARCK TRIB. (June 11, 2017) http://
bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/new-technology-could-recover
-more-oil-from-early-bakken-wells/article_13e7bb72-0e71-51dc-a503
-f71e69f60d40.html.
71. See O’REILLY, supra note 14, § 8.1.
72. See id. § 15.1.
73. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 62, at 29 (noting that fish and aquatic species can be harmed when wastewater is not
properly treated).
74. For example, greater sage grouse populations have been found to decline fourteen percent each year in densely drilled areas. Matthew Brown, Researchers: Limits on Drilling Not Enough To Protect Bird, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 19,
2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/news/articles/2016-10-19/researchers
-limits-on-drilling-not-enough-to-protect-bird.
75. LESLEY FLEISCHMAN ET AL., CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, GASPING FOR
BREATH: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH EFFECTS FROM OZONE POLLUTION FROM
THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 4 (Aug. 2016), http://www.catf.us/resources/
publications/files/Gasping_for_Breath.pdf.
76. Id.
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school children live within a mile of a production well. 77 Such
pollution might result in hefty fines for the oil producers, but the
damage will have already been done.78 Additionally, bits of the
sand required for fracking can lodge themselves in the lungs of
workers and lead to silicosis or cancer. 79 A recent study found
that even the noise from oil and gas operations can be linked to
problems with cardiovascular health, like elevated blood pressure and heart disease.80
Contaminated wastewater produces its own hazards.81 The
wastewater pumped into underground injection sites can find its
way back to surface waters 82 and contaminate drinking water. 83
77. ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON ET AL., DANGEROUS AND CLOSE: FRACKING
PUTS THE NATION’S MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE AT RISK 4 (2016), https://www
.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_dangerous_scrn
.pdf (“More than 650,000 kindergarten through twelfth grade children attend
school within one mile of a fracked well.”). Not all lawmakers are concerned by
this proximity. See, e.g., Colorado Lawmakers Kill Bill on Energy Drilling Near
Schools, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/
colorado/articles/2017-04-12/colorado-lawmakers-kill-bill-on-energy-drilling
-near-schools (“Urged on by industry and business groups, a Republican-led
Senate committee voted along party lines Wednesday to defeat a proposal to
extend the required distance between Colorado’s school and its oil and gas
wells.”).
78. See, e.g., Potentially Steep Pollution Fines for Colorado Oil Producer,
NEWSOK (June 26, 2017), http://www.newsok.com/potentially-steep-pollution
-fines-for-colorado-oil-producer/article/feed/1285424 (“[EPA and Colorado regulators] seek more than $100,000 a day in fines for problems they say occurred
over several years.”).
79. See Nell Greenfieldboyce, Sand from Fracking Could Pose Lung Disease
Risk to Workers, NPR (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2013/03/29/175042708/Sand-From-Fracking-Operations-Poses-Silicosis-Risk.
80. See Katie Herzog, Fracking Causes Noise Pollution That Could Be
Harmful to Your Health, GRIST (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.grist.org/briefly/
fracking-causes-noise-pollution-that-could-be-harmful-to-your-health (“Fracking operations can produce everything from a low rumble to loud drilling
noises.”).
81. See, e.g., Susan Phillips, Study: Fracking Didn’t Impact West Virginia
Groundwater, but Wastewater Spills Pollute Streams, NPR: STATEIMPACT (Apr.
24, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2017/04/24/study-fracking
-didnt-impact-west-virginia-groundwater-but-wastewater-spills-pollute
-streams (“[S]pill water associated with fracked wells and their wastewater has
an impact on the quality of streams in areas of intense shale gas development.”).
82. Evidence of Unconventional Oil and Gas Wastewater Found in Surface
Waters near Underground Injection Site, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (May 9, 2016),
http://www.usgs.gov/news/evidence-unconventional-oil-and-gas-wastewater
-found-surface-waters-near-underground-injection.
83. See Coral Davenport, Reversing Course, EPA Says Fracking Can Contaminate Drinking Water, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/13/us/reversing-course-epa-says-fracking-can-contaminate-drinking
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The harms do not end there. Evaporation pits “beckon water-loving birds” and kill at least half a million of them each year. 84
Surface wastewater spills can contaminate not only the soils, but
also nearby streams.85 Radioactive substances found in the
fracking wastewater, like selenium and radium, can linger in the
environment for millennia if robust clean-up operations are not
implemented. 86 The same is true for the radioactive substances
found in the solid waste of evaporation pits. 87 Other chemicals,
like the BTEX group associated with oil and gas production (benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene), are thought to have endocrine-disrupting effects even at low exposure levels.88 The endocrine system controls numerous vital systems, and is thus
important in every stage of a human’s life. 89 Equally alarming,
the federal government tends to “consider the chemicals safe unless they are proven to be harmful.” 90 Therefore, chemicals used
in fracking are not thoroughly tested for, say, those endocrinedisrupting effects before being widely used on the market. 91
-water.html (“[T]he new report found evidence that fracking has contributed to
drinking water contamination in all stages of the process . . . .”).
84. Thompson, supra note 53.
85. See Sharon Kelly, Duke Study Finds a “Legacy of Radioactivity,” Contamination from Thousands of Fracking Wastewater Spills, DESMOG (May 8,
2016), http://www.desmogblog.com/2016/05/08/duke-university-study-finds
-legacy-radioactivity-water-and-soil-contaminated-thousands-fracking
-wastewater-spills.
86. Id. (describing surface water contamination by wastewater to be “widespread and persistent, with clear evidence of direct water contamination from
fracking” in North Dakota).
87. For example, in 2016 North Dakota found illegal radioactive material
in the landfills of three different oil field waste operators. See Lauren Donovan,
Department Tightens Up on Radioactive Waste, BISMARCK TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2016),
http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/department-tightens
-up-on-radioactive-waste/article_c67b2e5f-b1ea-5a05-8157-665e6f295612.html.
88. See Ashley L. Bolden et al., New Look at BTEX: Are Ambient Levels a
Problem?, 49 ENVIRON. SCI. & TECH. 5261, 5270 (2015).
89. See Endocrine Disruption Fact Sheet, TEDX (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www
.endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/EDFactSheet11-7-11.pdf
(“[Endocrine disrupting chemicals] have been implicated in neurological diseases, reproductive disorders, thyroid dysfunction, immune and metabolic disorders and more.”).
90. Charles Lewis, Foreword to DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, TOXIC
DECEPTION: HOW THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE, BENDS THE
LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTH, at vii, x (1996).
91. See TEDx Talks, Letter to the President About Chemicals Disrupting
Our Bodies: Theo Colborn at TEDxMidAtlantic 2012, YOUTUBE (April 12, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2r2Rx8VRq48 (“Chemicals are now in wide
use that were never tested using assays that can detect disturbances in the
womb that eventually lead to diseases that might not appear until puberty or
even later in life . . . . Our laws have let this happen.”).
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Meanwhile, spills can occur at as many as sixteen percent of the
fracked wells each year.92
While the detrimental effects on environmental and human
health can be insidious, the seismic activity associated with
wastewater injections has been more obvious. 93 For example,
Oklahoma experienced only nine earthquakes between 2004 and
2008—just before the fracking boom began.94 In 2015 alone, it
experienced nearly 900 earthquakes.95 Although most of those
earthquakes are too small to cause property damage, some are
stronger. 96 A homeowner in Oklahoma received twelve stitches
after her stone fireplace collapsed in an earthquake.97 Other
Oklahomans filed a class action lawsuit for property damage and
devaluation. 98
Other industry-related accidents might be fluky, but they
could still be fatal for nearby property owners. In the spring of
2017, a home exploded in Colorado, killing two people and critically injuring a third. 99 Though fracking did not directly cause
the explosion, oil and gas activity did: “odorless gas seeping from
a cut-off underground pipeline,” a pipeline that had not been
shut off or capped, entered the home and “found an ignition
92. Matt McGrath, Thousands of Spills at US Oil and Gas Fracking Sites,
BBC (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-39032748.
93. In places where fracking wastewater is injected into the ground (as opposed to being dumped in an “evaporation pit”), there tends to be an increase in
earthquakes. See James Conca, Thanks to Fracking, Earthquake Hazards in
Parts of Oklahoma Now Comparable to California, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/09/07/the-connection-between
-earthquakes-and-fracking; see also Kathiann M. Kowalski, While Cause Remains Unclear, Earthquake Prompts New Look at Ohio Fracking, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2017/04/07/
while-cause-remains-unclear-earthquake-prompts-new-look-at-ohio-fracking
(describing a recent earthquake in Ohio within five miles of oil and gas extraction wells, with wastewater injection wells farther away).
94. David Wethe, Oil, Earthquakes and the Rush To Save Oklahoma,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-11-14/rare-oil-patch-hot-spot-emerges-in-america-s-earthquake-capital.
95. Anna Kuchment, Drilling-Induced Earthquakes May Endanger Millions in 2016, USGS Says, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.pbs
.org/newshour/updates/drilling-induced-earthquakes-may-endanger-millions
-in-2016-usgs-says.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Residents File Class-Action Suit over Man-Made Earthquakes,
NEWSOK (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.newsok.com/article/5527594.
99. Aldo Svaldi, After Fatal House Explosion, Anadarko Petroleum To Shut
Down 3,000 Wells in Northeastern Colorado, DENV. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), http://
www.denverpost.com/2017/04/26/anadarko-petroleum-shut-down-3000-wells
-after-house-explosion.
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source.” 100 The incident appears to be an anomaly. 101 Still, it suggests that older, vertical wells can pose a threat to public health
whether they are in active use or not. 102
This litany of threats to human and environmental health
prompts several questions: What can local community members
do when a petroleum operator wants to drill nearby? To what
extent can and should concerned citizens be involved in the permitting process? Who is charged with making the ultimate decision whether or not to allow drilling near a particular community? Are public health officials consulted? Section B addresses
these questions.
B. A COMPARISON OF STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS BOARDS
Decisions surrounding the permitting of drilling for onshore
petroleum on private land primarily fall under the jurisdiction
of states and tribes, rather than the federal government. 103 In
turn, these states charge their relevant state-level agencies with
all management decisions. The procedures governing each
state’s oil and gas board will vary depending on its enabling act.
The size of the board, its composition, and the requirements for
hearing and notice all vary widely from state to state. This Section compares the approaches taken by ten petroleum-producing
states. 104 Montana and Colorado are useful case studies: the former has an unusually robust hearing and notice regime, while
100. Bruce Finley, Deadly Firestone Explosion Caused by Odorless Gas Leaking from Cut Gas Flow Pipeline, DENV. POST (May 2, 2017), http://www
.denverpost.com/2017/05/02/firestone-explosion-cause-cut-gas-line.
101. Bruce Finley, Severed Gas Line Is Blamed for Fatal Explosion; Colorado
Orders Thousands of Wells, Miles of Pipeline Inspected, DENV. POST (May 2,
2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/02/firestone-explosion-oil-wells
-pipelines-inspected (“In our experience, what has taken place here is highly
unusual and required a confluence of a number of different events to come to
pass . . . .”).
102. See Christopher N. Osher & Bruce Finley, Oil and Gas Industry Pipeline Problems Are Well-Established. Why Did It Take a Fatal Explosion To Spur
Action?, DENV. POST (May 7, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/07/
firestone-explosion-raises-questions-pipeline-risks (“Broken underground pipelines carrying oil or gas from wells to tanks and to other equipment in the field
are the leading cause of hazardous oil and gas industry leaks . . . .”).
103. See Natural Gas Extraction – Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
104. For a map of fracked wells across the United States, see, Competition
for Water in US Shale Energy Development, CERES (2016), http://alpha
.blueraster.io/ceres/www/index.html (depicting the parts of the United States
affected by petroleum development, as well as the regional differences in water
stress).
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the latter includes a much wider variety of specialists as voting
board members. 105 Because these procedures help keep the public informed and, arguably, safer, the two states stand out among
their peers who have no such procedures in place.106
First, this Section briefly assesses the state-level administrative laws that govern oil and gas boards, including the general
parameters of the hearing and notice requirements in Montana
and Colorado. Next, it examines the oil and gas boards of Montana and Colorado in depth, comparing how the two states have
approached the question of representation in the agencies, and
to what extent the agencies include the public in the permit process. Lastly, this Section compares the procedures in Montana
and Colorado to those of eight other states, all of which have chosen to regulate petroleum extraction differently.
1. An Introduction to State-Level Agencies
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
1946 107 as a response to the proliferation of federal agencies during President Roosevelt’s New Deal.108 The APA governs the
rulemaking process of federal agencies and programs.109 Because the agencies use regulations to compel behavior in certain
sectors, they possess the power to set “wide-ranging policies.” 110
The APA also addresses the judicial review available to individuals who are adversely affected by agency actions and the issuance of permits.111 To bolster the transparency of agency decisions, Congress passed the Government in the Sunshine Act in
1976.112 The Act declares that it is “the policy of the United

105. See generally infra Part I.B.2 (assessing in depth the oil and gas boards
of Montana and Colorado).
106. See infra Table 1.
107. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012).
108. See Administrative Procedure Act, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://
www.foreffectivegov.org/node/226 (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
109. Id.
110. Id. But cf. Rui J. P. De Figueiredo, Jr. & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, The
Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts, 47 J.L. & ECON.
569, 571 (2004) (“Despite the claim that APAs have a material effect on policy
outcomes, scant empirical evidence demonstrates this.”).
111. Summary of the Administrative Procedure Act, EPA, https://www.epa
.gov/laws-regulations/summary-administrative-procedure-act (last visited Oct.
13, 2017).
112. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
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States that the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decision making processes of the Federal
Government.” 113
Over the course of forty years, all states enacted their own
administrative laws regarding hearing and notice, both in the
form of state-level APAs and as sunshine laws.114 The purposes
of the state-level APAs tend to be similar to the federal version:
(1) to “give notice to the public of governmental action and to
provide for public participation in that action”; (2) to “establish
general uniformity and due process safeguards in agency rulemaking”; and (3) to establish “judicial review of agency rules and
final agency decisions.” 115 Hearing and notice are important
components of democratic systems.116 They function as a safeguard against unjustified deprivation—particularly the significant deprivation of property. 117 Notice is considered “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process” to let
interested parties know about a relevant action and “afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.” 118 Notice must be
provided in a way that allows all affected property owners to
have actual notice.119 Hearings are necessary because “[p]arties
whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.”120
Beyond these generalities, the rights of citizens to participate in agency decisions can be different from one state to the
next. For example, the Montana open meeting law specifies a
“liberal construction,” stating that “[t]he people of the state do
not wish to abdicate their sovereignty to the agencies which
113. Id. § 2.
114. See Sarah Klaper, The Eye-Roll Heard ‘Round the World: Protecting Citizens’ Free Speech and Petition Rights in Accessing Local Government, 10
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 299, 317 n.166 (2012).
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-101(2)(a)–(c) (2015).
116. See id. § 2-4-601(1) (“[A]ll parties must be afforded an opportunity for
hearing after reasonable notice.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(4)(a)–
(a.5) (2016) (requiring an “opportunity” to be heard).
117. See, e.g., Fritz v. Bd. of Trs., 252 N.E.2d 567, 572 (Ind. 1969) (“Fairness
and justice require that [plaintiff ] should be given notice . . . to reasonably apprise him of the fact that he and his property are involved [in an assessment]
and that he be given an opportunity to resist the attempt of the public authorities to enforce their will to take his property without an opportunity to be
heard.”).
118. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
119. See, e.g., Meadowbrook Manor, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Park, 104
N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1960) (“[M]ailed notice of special assessment hearings
would satisfy due process because such notice is reasonably calculated to inform
the taxpayer of the assessment hearing.”).
120. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
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serve them.” 121 Montana law requires posted notice only if the
issue is “of significant interest to the public,” but that phrase has
not been defined.122
Similarly, Colorado courts interpret that state’s open meeting laws broadly. 123 Its statute states that “the formation of public policy is public business and may not be conducted in secret.” 124 Notice of meetings in Colorado must be “full and
timely.” 125 “[F]ull and timely notice” is not defined, 126 but has
been interpreted as a flexible standard that balances the competing interests of public participation and the agency’s ability
to conduct business. 127
Like Montana and Colorado, all of the oil and gas boards
discussed in this Note are governed by: (1) their respective
state’s APA; (2) their respective state’s open meeting (or sunshine) laws; (3) the enabling act that sprang the agency into being; and (4) any additional regulations that the agency has
adopted through its rulemaking procedures.128 With those considerations in mind, the following Subsection embarks on an indepth comparison of the oil and gas agencies of Montana and
Colorado.
2. A Comparison of Oil and Gas Agencies in Montana and
Colorado
As discussed in the previous Subsection, the agencies
charged with overseeing the onshore drilling permits for petroleum companies are state-level oil and gas boards. These can
vary considerably from one state to the next, largely depending
on how each state’s legislature has chosen to structure and empower the agency. This Subsection will contrast the approaches
that Montana and Colorado have taken.

121. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-201.
122. Id. § 2-3-103(1)(a).
123. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 298 P.3d
1027, 1029 (Colo. App. 2012).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-401 (2016).
125. Id. § 24-6-402(2)(c).
126. Id.
127. Town of Marble v. Darien, 181 P.3d 1148, 1152 (Colo. 2008) (en banc).
128. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, supra note 108 (“ The main requirements for informal rulemaking are: [p]ublication of a ‘Notice of Proposed Rulemaking’. . . [o]pportunity for public participation by submission of written comments; [c]onsideration of the agency of the public comments . . . and
[p]ublication of a final rule not less than 30 days before its effective date . . . .”).
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a. Montana
The Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (the Board)
has seven members.129 Three need to be from the oil and gas industry, with at least three years of experience in petroleum production. 130 Two must be unaffiliated with the industry, but be
“landowners residing in oil or gas producing counties”—one who
owns the property’s mineral rights, and the other who does
not. 131 One member must be an attorney. 132 The Governor appoints four of the seven members at the time she takes office and
appoints the others two years later, all for four-year terms.133
The Board is primarily concerned with preventing waste of
petroleum resources and conserving such resources “by encouraging maximum efficient recovery” of them. 134 It also “seeks to
prevent oil and gas operations from harming nearby land or underground resources.” 135 The Board oversees the permitting of
not just exploratory and production wells, but also of injection
and disposal wells. 136 A separate division performs a technical
review of a company’s injection well proposal to ensure that underground sources of drinking water will not be at risk. 137 This
step includes a “public notice and hearing process.” 138 The Board
can then issue or deny the permit, or issue the permit with certain modifications.139 The jurisdiction of the Board extends everywhere in Montana other than tribal lands. 140
Across the state there have been 4000 to 7000 wells fracked
in 132 different fields. 141 The Board requires that petroleum
drillers give public notice whenever an operator wishes to drill a
129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-3303(2) (2015).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation, MONT. BD. OF OIL & GAS,
http://www.bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/Boardsummaries.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Holly K. Michels, Companies Don’t Have To Disclose Fracking Chemicals, but Lawsuit Wants To Change That, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Apr. 10, 2017),
http://www.billingsgazette.com/news/government-and-politics/fracking-suit-on
-hold-as-legislature-considers-change-to-disclosure/article_4cebbedf-8cda-53cc
-ab4a-f2879fcc5051.html.
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well outside of the existing fields. 142 In line with Montana’s general notice requirements, the applicant must publish a newspaper posting in Helena and the affected local county. 143 A public
hearing will be held if: (1) any interested person demands an opportunity to be heard; (2) the Board members think that the applicant is not in substantial compliance with Montana’s drilling
rules; or (3) the drilling operations require further environmental review. 144 At the hearing, the Board can grant or deny the
permit, or can choose to impose other conditions it considers appropriate. 145
These structural and procedural aspects of Montana’s Board
share some overlap with Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission. However, in important respects, the two states diverge: Colorado’s Commission includes members who specialize
in public and environmental health, and it provides an optional
public forum instead of hearings. Colorado’s approach is considered next.
b. Colorado
The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (the
Commission) oversees the vast petroleum activity within Colorado’s borders. 146 It has nine members: seven appointed by the
Governor, along with the Executive Director of the Department
of Natural Resources and the Executive Director of the Department of Public Health and Environment. 147 The two executive
directors are ex officio voting members. 148 Two members need to
be from west of the continental divide; three must have “substantial experience” in the petroleum industry; one must be a local
government official; one needs “formal training or substantial
experience in environmental or wildlife protection” and another
in “soil conservation or reclamation”; and one should be “actively
engaged in agricultural production.” 149 Of the seven appointed

142. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.601(1) (2017).
143. Id. at 36.22.601(1)(a).
144. Id. at 36.22.601(4)(a)–(c).
145. Id. at 36.22.601(5)(a)–(b).
146. For a map of all the wells in Colorado as of April 2017, including those
that are active, abandoned, or injection wells, see Kevin Hamm, Here’s a Map
of Every Oil and Gas Well in the State of Colorado, DENV. POST (May 1, 2017),
http://www.denverpost.com/2017/05/01/oil-gas-wells-colorado-map.
147. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a)(I) (2016).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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members, no more than four can be from the same political
party.150
The Commission’s purpose is to foster “the responsible development of Colorado’s oil and gas natural resources in a manner consistent with the protection of public health, safety, and
welfare, including the environment and wildlife resources.” 151
The Commission must protect these public and private interests
while not wasting Colorado’s petroleum resources. 152 It also is
required to recognize that the state’s wildlife and environment
“are to be protected, preserved, enhanced, and managed for the
use, benefit, and enjoyment of the people of this state.” 153
To ensure that public and environmental health are not impaired, Colorado includes an additional level of oversight in the
permit process. Local governments can appoint a designee to
consult with the permit applicant and Commission Director
about the proposed permit to drill. 154 They can also ask the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment to assess
the proposal. 155 Colorado Parks and Wildlife must also be consulted by the Commission in certain circumstances when permits are granted or modified. 156 Any person can also file a request to be automatically notified by mail about any proceeding
that will take place in front of the Commission. 157
When a hearing occurs, the Commission must publish a
newspaper posting in Denver and the local county in which the
affected land is situated. 158 Notice of a hearing must also be
mailed directly to the last known mailing address of the person
to be given notice or personally served. 159 Notice is given to the
150. Id.
151. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, http://cogcc.state.co.us/#/
home (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). The Colorado Court of Appeals recently decided that “the clear language” of the Commission’s enabling legislation does
not support the typical balancing test of industry interests against public
health. Rather, it is a mandate that oil and gas exploration in Colorado “be regulated subject to the protection of public health . . . including protection of the
environment and wildlife resources.” Martinez v. Colo. Oil & Gas Comm’n, No.
16CA0564, 2017 WL 1089556, at *7 (Colo. App. Mar. 23, 2017).
152. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(II).
153. Id. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(IV). See also Colorado Habitat Stewardship Act of
2007, id. § 34-60-128.
154. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:306.b(1) (2017).
155. Id. § 404-1:306.b(2).
156. Id. § 404-1:306.c.
157. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-108(5).
158. Id. § 34-60-108(4).
159. Id.
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appropriate parties at least thirty-five days in advance and is
paid for by the applicant. 160 Who is considered an appropriate
party depends on the particular application; for example, notice
of applications affecting other drilling units must be served on
the owners of those units. 161
In addition to the limited use of hearings, an application
that would result in too much well density can trigger a local
public forum.162 Notice of local public forums is mailed to all of
“the surface owners within the application area” at least twentyone days before the forum date.163 It is also posted in local newspapers fourteen days before the forum date. 164 The purpose of
such forums is to make sure the proposed plan to increase well
density will not endanger “public health, safety, and welfare, including the environment and wildlife resources.” 165 The ultimate
result of the public forum is a report that the Commission uses
in its consideration of the application.166
3. How Other States Design and Empower Their Oil and Gas
Boards
The previous Subsection presented a detailed view of how
Montana and Colorado designed and empowered their respective
oil and gas boards. This Subsection assesses those agencies
throughout the country. How do other states approach the notice
and hearing requirements surrounding drilling permits? Who
must be represented in their agencies? These questions are addressed by briefly considering the oil and gas boards of eight additional states with petroleum reserves: Arkansas, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming.167 These states were chosen for geographical diversity and
for diversity in their approach to the permit process. 168
160. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:507(a).
161. See id. § 404-1:507(b).
162. See id. § 404-1:508(b)(2) (specifying that a public forum could be convened on a motion from the Commission, the Director, the Local Government
Designee, the applicant, or upon request from a citizen of the county to be affected by the application).
163. Id. § 404-1:508(d)(1)–(2).
164. Id. § 404-1:508(d)(4).
165. Id. § 404-1:508(f )(1); see also id. § 404-1:508(g) (requiring that forum
participants be allowed to make statements relating to “public health, safety,
and welfare”).
166. Id. § 404-1:508(h).
167. For an overview of the differences, see Table 1.
168. For a comparison of how much natural gas these states produce, see
Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
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Table 1: Comparison of Oil and Gas Agencies in Ten
States 169

Arkansas’s nine commissioners are appointed by the Governor, “at least a majority of whom shall be experienced in the development, production, or transportation of oil or gas.” 170 Arkansas requires public notice in a local newspaper for proposed
injection wells, 171 but only requires notice by certified mail to
surface owners for proposed exploratory wells.172 New York similarly requires notice by certified mail to “any landowner whose
surface rights will be affected by drilling operations” as well as
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dc_NUS_mmcf_m.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2017).
169. For the citations supporting the entries in this table, refer to Appendix
following this Note.
170. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-71-102(a)–(b) (2017).
171. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, RULE H1 CLASS II DISPOSAL AND CLASS II COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL WELL PERMIT APPLICATION PROCEDURES 198 (2017), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/rules/rulesregs
.pdf.
172. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-203(b). “After written notice of the operator ’s
intent to begin shale operations is given under this subsection, an operator is
not required to give any other notice to begin, conduct, or complete shale operations on the surface owner ’s property.” Id. § 15-72-203(c)(4).
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“to any local government affected of [sic] the location of the drilling site.” 173 Despite having access to the petroleum reserves
within the Marcelles Shale formation, New York banned fracking in 2015.174 Its Division of Mineral Resources, within the Department of Environmental Conservation, still oversees permit
requests for oil and gas wells not implementing the high-volume
fracking techniques. 175 The civil servants who oversee these permit requests likely have backgrounds in petroleum or geology. 176
Like New York, Pennsylvania handles its permit requests
through its Department of Environmental Protection, rather
than an appointed board. 177 It allows landowners or any “affected person suffering pollution or diminution of a water supply
as a result of drilling” to request that the Department conduct
an investigation. 178 The Department publishes a notice when it
issues or amends a general water quality management permit, 179 but does not publish any notice for a general drilling permit. 180 As for its fracking wastewater, Pennsylvania prefers to
send it to Ohio’s injection wells, rather than operate its own injection wells. 181
173. N.Y. ENVT’L. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (McKinney 2017).
174. See New York and Fracking, EARTHJUSTICE, http://www.earthjustice
.org/features/new-york-and-fracking (last visited Oct. 13, 2017); see also N.Y.
DEP’T OF ENV. CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY
PROGRAM 42 (2015), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/
findingstatehvhf62015.pdf (“[T]here are no feasible or prudent alternatives that
would adequately avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts and that
address the scientific uncertainties and risks to public health from [high-volume
hydraulic fracturing].”).
175. See Division of Mineral Resources, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/636.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
176. See Email from Thomas E. Noll, Director, Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting & Mgmt., N.Y. Div. of Mineral Res., to author (Mar. 17, 2017, 09:35 CDT)
(on file with author).
177. See Office of Oil and Gas Management, PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.dep.pa.gov/business/energy/oilandgasprograms/oilandgasmgmt/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
178. 25 PA. CODE § 78.51(b) (2017).
179. Id. § 91.27(b)(1).
180. See id. §§ 78.11–.15.
181. See Kathiann M. Kowalski, Fracking Wastewater Is Big Business in
Ohio, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (July 18, 2014), http://www.midwestenergynews
.com/2014/07/18/fracking-wastewater-is-big-business-in-ohio (“[Ohio] now has
more than 200 active injection wells for oil and gas waste . . . . In contrast, only
seven injection wells were active in neighboring Pennsylvania, which sends millions of gallons of its fracked wells’ wastewater to Ohio.”). Pennsylvania also
recycles its flowback water and operates a few injection wells within its borders.
See Marie Cusick, Pennsylvania OKs New Injection Wells for Oil and Gas
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The five members of Ohio’s Oil and Gas Commission are appointed by the Governor.182 One must represent “a major petroleum company”; one must represent “the public”; one must represent “independent petroleum operators”; one must be
“experienced in oil and gas law”; and one must be “experienced
in geology or petroleum engineering.”183 No more than three can
be of the same political party. 184 When drilling a well “within an
urbanized area,” applicants must provide notice to property owners within 500 feet of the potential well, 185 who in turn must notify each residence within that property. 186 Drilling lease proposals do not mandate a public hearing.187 However, proposals
to drill in “urbanized area[s]” do trigger a public meeting for
which those same nearby property owners receive notice. 188
North Dakota’s Industrial Commission includes the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Agriculture Commissioner. 189
Among other things, this Commission oversees and regulates the
oil and gas industry in North Dakota.190 Permits are conducted
through a subsidiary body, the Oil and Gas Division, 191 whose
director is appointed by the Commission. 192 North Dakota requires that an exploration permit applicant provide a copy of the
relevant statutes to both the surface owner and to landowners
within a half mile of the proposed exploration area. 193
Oklahoma’s drilling operations are overseen by the elected
three-member Oklahoma Corporation Commission, who also
oversee public utilities, trucking, and railroad crossings.194 The
Oklahoma Constitution specifies that none of the Commission
members shall have any interests in various transportation and
Wastewater, NPR: STATEIMPACT (Mar. 27, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/
pennsylvania/2017/03/27/pennsylvania-oks-new-injection-wells-for-oil-and-gas
-wastewater.
182. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.35(A) (2017).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. § 1509.06(A)(9).
186. Id. § 1509.60.
187. See id. § 1509.06.
188. Id. § 1509.61(A).
189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-17-02 (2017).
190. Id. § 38-08-04.
191. Id. § 38-08.1-04.1(3).
192. See North Dakota Industrial Commission, N.D. STATE GOV’T, http://
www.nd.gov/ndic/ic-about.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08.1-04.1(4).
194. See Oklahoma Corporation Commission History, OKLA. CORP. COMM’N,
http://www.occeweb.com/Comm/commissionhist.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
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communication companies, but does not include the oil and gas
industry. 195 It is also permissible for Commissioners to accept
personal financial contributions from the oil and gas industry. 196
Oklahoma requires notice to the public: (1) when drilling operators request an injection well permit;197 and (2) when drilling operators submit a remediation proposal for a particular site.198
Texas parallels Oklahoma in its Railroad Commission (the
entity in charge of oil and natural gas in that state): three elected
members make up the Commission.199 Wyoming, on the other
hand, parallels North Dakota by having its governor as a member of the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. 200 The Director
of the Office of State Lands and Investments and the State Geologist also each serve as members, along with two “additional
members from the public at large . . . qualified to serve the oil
and gas industry of this state,” who are appointed by the Governor. 201
Ultimately, the decision-making structure surrounding
whether to issue a drilling permit can vary greatly from state to
state. Part I presented an overview of the inherent complications
when balancing petroleum production and its waste products
with the interests of adjacent property owners and community
members. The state-level agencies in charge of permitting and
other regulatory decisions must tread carefully between representing the health concerns of local community members and between encouraging the business interests of their state. The next
Part addresses this problem.

195. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 16.
196. One recently elected member of the Commission received nearly
$80,000 in donations within a two-month period of his election to help pay off
his campaign loan—donations “mostly from donors in the oil and gas industry.”
See Nolan Clay, New Oklahoma Corporation Commissioner Collects Enough To
Pay Off $200,000 Campaign Loan, NEWSOK (May 2, 2015), http://www.newsok
.com/article/5415674.
197. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-5(d)–(e) (2016).
198. Id. § 165:10-10-10. Depending on the interest such notice generates, a
public meeting may follow. Id.
199. See Commissioners, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/
about-us/commissioners (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
200. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a) (2017).
201. Id.

368

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:343

II. THE CURRENT HEARING AND NOTICE REGIME DOES
NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT COMMUNITIES NEAR
DRILLING OPERATIONS
The states surveyed in Part I attempted to design oil and
gas boards in a way that serves both of the competing interests
discussed above—some states more successfully than others.
Montana’s Board and Colorado’s Commission stand out for offering more safeguards to the public, both procedurally (through a
hearing and notice regime) or structurally (by mandating a more
diverse board) than other states. But even in those two states,
the oil and gas boards can fall short of adequately protecting the
interests of communities near drilling operations. Part II of this
Note assesses these shortcomings.
First, this Part considers the longstanding tension between
the petroleum industry’s interest in efficiency and the public’s
interest in health and safety. It then discusses the approaches
Montana, Colorado, and other states have taken to ameliorate
this tension. Finally, this Part considers the implications of the
makeup of oil and gas boards—that is, (1) how many members
should be represented in such agencies; (2) the necessary characteristics of those members; and (3) whether those members are
elected or appointed.
A. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY’S
INTEREST IN EFFICIENCY AND THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST IN
HEALTH AND SAFETY
Like most business ventures, the petroleum industry does
not want a regulatory regime that would likely result in delay
and excessive costs.202 The rationale tends to be: if there are uncalculated delays and excessive costs, then general uncertainty
will inhibit the number of wells that can be drilled; this will
lessen that company’s impact in a given state; and that will in
turn hurt that state’s tax revenue, its employment, and its
schools. 203 In other words, it is thought to be in the best interest
of a state’s citizens for the companies to drill without excessive
public hearing and notice requirements—or much involvement
from the public at all. The result is a “regulatory vacuum” within
the oil and gas industry. 204

202. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 3.
203. Id. at 5.
204. See, e.g., Whaley & Ingold, supra note 8.
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When an interested group wants to minimize the dangers of
fracking, they sometimes limit “fracking” to the initial steps of
drilling, and ignore wastewater issues. 205 The evidence linking
public health problems and the first step of fracking is sparse. 206
If that were the only safety concern associated with drilling, then
perhaps the industry would be right to argue for less oversight.
However, the documented public health danger lies not only in
the first step of fracking, but also in the related air pollution, in
the specks of fracking sand lodging themselves in workers’ lungs,
and in the millions of gallons of associated wastewaters.207 The
danger lies in the endocrine-disrupting chemicals found in the
wastewater that were never thoroughly tested before being
widely used by the industry. 208 It lies in the pressing possibility
that another wastewater-induced earthquake will rattle someone’s Oklahoma house, damaging the property and perhaps
hurting those inside. 209 It lies in the fact that someone near a
drilling operation must endure regular ozone alerts to know
whether it is safe to be outside that day210 or perhaps always
wear an oxygen mask outside, just to err on the side of caution. 211
205. Seamus McGraw, Is Fracking Safe? The Ten Most Controversial Claims
About Natural Gas Drilling, POPULAR MECHANICS (May 1, 2016), http://www
.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/g161/top-10-myths-about-natural-gas
-drilling-6386593 (stating that it is unlikely that the fluids injected during the
initial high-volume fracking would migrate into groundwater, without mentioning the potential for wastewater spills during a subsequent step of the process).
206. See, e.g., Induced Earthquakes: Myths and Misconceptions, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/induced/myths.php (last
visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Fracking is NOT causing most of the induced earthquakes. Wastewater disposal is the primary cause of the recent increase in
earthquakes in the central United States.”). But cf. Fracking, FOOD & WATER
WATCH, https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/problems/fracking (last visited
Oct. 13, 2017) (“ The entire fracking process—from drilling a well to dealing with
the resulting toxic waste—endangers our water and the health of our communities.”).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 75–85.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 88–91.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 93–98.
210. See Ann Chambers Noble, The Jonah Field and Pinedale Anticline: A
Natural-Gas Success Story, WYOHISTORY.ORG, http://www.wyohistory.org/
encyclopedia/jonah-field-and-pinedale-anticline-natural-gas-success-story (last
visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Air pollution is now a way of life. . . . High ozone levels
can be particularly dangerous to people with compromised immune systems and
respiratory problems.”).
211. See Abrahm Lustgarten & Nicholas Kusnetz, Science Lags as Health
Problems Emerge near Gas Fields, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2011), https://www
.propublica.org/article/science-lags-as-health-problems-emerge-near-gas-fields
(“I took to wearing a respirator and swim goggles outside to tend to my animals.”).
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It lies in the nerve damage and in the loss of the ability to taste
and smell.212
The industry’s response to such allegations tends to be one
of diminishment or obfuscation. Because many protesters also
mistakenly associate the first step of fracking with the subsequent health dangers, the industry can respond by marshalling
evidence that this step played no role. 213 A common focal point
for both sides tends to be whether fracking has or has not contaminated drinking water. 214 This is an important question, especially after the Environmental Protection Agency’s recent reversal on the question. 215 But, that debate can be an unfortunate
diversion from holding the industry responsible for the broader
health and safety hazards that its drilling practices have been
proven to cause.
Another common counterargument to fracking’s harms
tends to focus on its ability to help the United States achieve
energy independence. 216 The United States can “leverage its
abundant natural gas reserves as a transitional bridge” to renewable energy, which makes sense since everyone “want[s] the
most bang for their buck.” 217 And, besides, fracking advocates
argue, since there are very real “environmental and health benefits of natural gas over other fossil fuels,”218 the United States
ought to incentivize oil and gas operators to drill as much as possible. Such arguments are likely similarly put forth by members

212. Id.
213. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 21
(“[T]here have been several highly-publicized cases involving allegations that
fracing [sic] was responsible for well contamination or other environmental
harm. . . . Even the most publicized allegations, however, have proven greatly
exaggerated or false under further scrutiny.”).
214. See id. at 22.
215. Davenport, supra note 83 (reporting that the EPA has found evidence
that fracking does contribute to drinking water contamination).
216. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 9, at 157–64.
217. Barry Stevens, The Benefits of Shale Gas Far Outweigh the Negatives
of Fracking, OILPRICE.COM (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.oilprice.com/Energy/
Natural-Gas/The-Benefits-Of-Shale-Gas-Far-Outweigh-The-Negatives-Of
-Fracking.html. For example, the city of Duluth, Minnesota, is converting a
downtown steam plant from coal to natural gas, and later to “utilize other energy sources to heat the water, including solar and biomass.” Dan Kraker, Duluth Launches Coal-Cutting Energy Pilot, MPRNEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://
www.mprnews.org/story/2017/04/12/duluth-launches-coalcutting-energy-pilot.
218. See Stevens, supra note 217.
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of oil and gas boards who favor deregulating the petroleum industry. 219 The trouble is, such a focal point tends to brush away
negative environmental and public health effects as necessary
compromises—compromises borne by communities who had no
say in whether the tradeoff was worth it or not.
As extensions of state governments, oil and gas agencies exist to serve in the interest of the public. When drilling on private
lands, the petroleum industry is bound by the rules and procedures of the state-level oil and gas agencies. 220 Those agencies
should act as guardians, carefully balancing the state’s interest
in the economic benefits of drilling with the state’s interest in
the health and well-being of its citizenry and environment. Too
often, such agencies embrace the myopic efficiency arguments of
the petroleum industry, rather than the long-term health and
safety arguments posed by numerous non-industry parties.
Hearing and notice procedures can help increase transparency
and hold the industry accountable for its policies.
B. A COMPARISON OF THE HEARING AND NOTICE REGIMES
SURROUNDING THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN MONTANA AND
COLORADO
Despite the documented connection between these public
health and safety problems and the petroleum industry, citizens
have few avenues to prevent fracking-related harm before it occurs.221 A common tactic in recent years has been the assertion
of local control through ordinances: a county, say, will vote to
ban fracking within its borders.222 These ordinances are often
struck down in subsequent litigation on the grounds that state

219. See, e.g., Commissioner Wayne Christian, R.R COMM’N TEX., http://www
.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/commissioners/christian (last visited Oct. 13, 2017)
(“During his time in the Texas House, Christian . . . . accumulated a strong record of standing for free markets and against burdensome regulations.”); see also
Chairman Christi Craddick, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/
about-us/commissioners/craddick (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (“Craddick has
pushed to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of an energy industry that
is driving the state’s unparalleled economic success.”).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 107–28.
221. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Paul Rogers, Fracking Ban: Environmentalists Declare Victory
on Monterey Measure Z, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www
.mercurynews.com/2016/11/09/fracking-ban-environmentalists-declare-victory
-on-monterey-measure-z (describing a county that recently voted to ban fracking within its limits).
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law has already preempted them.223 Similarly, counties cannot
veto an oil and gas board’s decision to locate a petroleum waste
treating plant within their borders. 224
Another route for communities could be to sue their state
when the oil and gas boards allegedly fail to adequately protect
their interests.225 Or they could sue the oil companies. 226 But,
litigation is time-consuming and costly.227 Meanwhile, the harm
has often already been inflicted.
Given the absence of strong mechanisms for local control
over fracking, perhaps the procedures of the state-level oil and
gas agencies can help. If such agencies adopt stronger notice and
comment regimes, then the public could have the opportunity to
be involved in permitting decisions before harm to environmental and human health occurs. This Section addresses the benefits
and drawbacks of the hearing and notice regimes governing the
oil and gas agencies of Montana and Colorado, comparing them
to their counterparts nationwide. The Section then considers
223. See, e.g., Swepi, LP v. Mora County, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1146 (D.N.M.
2015) (“ The Ordinance conflicts . . . with state law by prohibiting activities that
state law permits: the production and extraction of oil and gas.”); Billy Corriher
& Sean Wright, Ohio Supreme Court Says Towns Aren’t Allowed To Ban Fracking, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.thinkprogress.org/ohio
-supreme-court-says-towns-arent-allowed-to-ban-fracking (“[T]he state’s high
court ruled that Ohio has ‘sole and exclusive’ authority over oil and gas production, determining that the Ohio Constitution does not permit a local community
to ban drilling approved by the state Department of Natural Resources.”); Michael Wines, Colorado Court Strikes Down Local Bans on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES
(May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/colorado-court-strikes
-down-local-bans-on-fracking.html (“[T]he court said a moratorium in Fort Collins and a ban in Longmont were invalid because state law pre-empted them.”).
224. See, e.g., Justices Say ND County Cannot Veto Site of Treating Facility,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/north
-dakota/articles/2017-03-07/justices-say-nd-county-cannot-veto-site-of-treating
-facility (“[T]he sole authority for [such] zoning rests with the commission,
which regulates energy development in the state.”).
225. See Danika Worthington, Neighborhood Group Sues State for Failing
To Enforce Regulations over Oil and Gas, DENV. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), http://
www.denverpost.com/2016/11/18/neighborhood-sues-colorado-oil-and-gas.
226. See, e.g., Pawnee Nation Sues Oklahoma Oil Companies in Tribal Court
Over Earthquake Damage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/03/04/us/pawnee-nation-oklahoma-oil-earthquake-lawsuit.html
(“ The oil and gas industry has been the target of significant litigation over the
years.”).
227. Along with the fact that such suits can be hard to win. See Ron Todt,
$4.24M Verdict in Pennsylvania Drilling Lawsuit Tossed, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 1,
2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/pennsylvania/articles/2017
-04-01/424m-verdict-in-pennsylvania-drilling-lawsuit-tossed (finding conflicting evidence for whether fracking caused water contamination).
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whether those states’ procedures adequately protect the interests of the communities and property owners living near drilling
operations.
1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hearing and Notice
Regime of the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation
The Montana approach has uniquely strong hearing and notice elements; of the ten states surveyed, no other state holds
public hearings before deciding whether to grant a permit. 228 A
few states post a public notice after receiving a request for a
wastewater injection permit. 229 In Oklahoma, if a protest
against an injection well is received within fifteen days, then the
matter will be heard in front of an administrative law judge. 230
In Arkansas, protesters have even more power against injection
wells: “If an objection is received the application shall be deemed
denied.” 231 However, the Texas Commission specifies that only
an “affected person” is entitled to a protest hearing for an injection well, defining such a person as someone “who has suffered
or will suffer actual injury or economic damage other than as a
member of the general public.” 232 While these states do manage
to include the public in the decision-making process for injection
well permits (which are the likely cause of the increased seismic
activity), they do not have Montana’s protections to include local
communities in the initial drilling permit decision.
Along with its unusually robust hearing procedures, it is
similarly unusual that Montana requires petroleum drillers to
give public notice whenever the operator wishes to drill a well
outside of existing fields. 233 Perhaps this is because notice is generally required in Montana when the issue “is of significant interest to the public.” 234 This strong hearing and notice regime
bolsters the Board’s goal of minimizing the harm that the oil and

228. See supra Table 1.
229. Id.
230. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-15(b)(4) (2016).
231. See ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, supra note 171.
232. Protested Applications, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx
.us/oil-gas/publications-and-notices/manuals/injectiondisposal-well-manual/
summary-of-standards-and-procedures/protested-applications (last visited Oct.
13, 2017).
233. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Mont. Petroleum Ass’n, supra note 6, at 3;
see also MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.601(1) (2017).
234. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-103(1)(a) (2016).
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gas operations can cause to nearby land and underground resources.235 It errs on the side of ensuring the public’s right to
information unless that information infringes on the right to individual privacy.236
What is troubling with the Montana approach is the parameters of its notice requirements. 237 Having a strong hearing regime does not do much good if no one knows that they should
demand one. Montana’s requirement to publish notice of a new
well in the local newspaper and in Helena’s newspaper will notify some citizens. 238 But it is likely that numerous other citizens, including possibly adjacent landowners, will receive no notice of the new well until it is being constructed. This can be
contrasted with the notice requirements many states enact for
alerting certain individuals to imminent drilling activity: notice
by certified mail.239
If the adjacent landowners never receive notice, it could take
time for them to learn of a new well’s existence—for example, a
cattleman with a sprawling ranch may not use portions of his
grazing land regularly. By the time he finds out that a well is
being operated near his land, he might not have been able to take
accurate baseline measurements of his water quality. Such data
is important if a landowner later wants to file a nuisance lawsuit
backed with proper evidentiary support. While the Montana
hearing requirements are strong, the notice requirements do not
ensure that parties who could be adversely affected by the drilling will receive any advanced notice at all.
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hearing and Notice
Regime of the Colorado Oil and Gas Commission
The Colorado approach has many strengths. First, it includes a unique automatic notification tool: individuals may sign
up to receive notice by mail about matters to be addressed in
upcoming Commission meetings. 240 This is much simpler than
in Montana, where interested parties must carefully scan the
235. See Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation, supra note 132.
236. See Flesh v. Bd. of Trs., 786 P.2d 4, 9 (Mont. 1990) (“ The public’s right
to know is not absolute but must be balanced against the competing right to
individual privacy.”).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 121–22, 142–43.
238. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
239. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-203 (2017) (requiring notice by mail to surface owners); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.06(A)(9) (2016) (requiring notice by
mail to urban landowners within 500 feet of the surface location of the well).
240. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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Helena newspaper each day.241 It appears to be a unique feature
among the states surveyed. The drawback of this tool is that
many potentially affected parties likely will not know that they
could have signed up for automatic notifications.
The Commission’s general notice rule is also strong: when a
person must be given notice, that notice must be mailed to them
directly.242 This means that when an operator applies to
“chang[e] certain well location setbacks” or applies for “involuntary pooling,” certain parties—usually other oil and gas operators—need to be notified directly.243 The Commission also requires similar notice to be given to the local government
designee, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, and Colorado Parks and Wildlife (when certain applications are filed). 244
This section of Colorado statute lacks any mention of direct
notice to adjacent property owners who are not affiliated with
the petroleum industry. Perhaps the local government designee
is thought to suffice, since the issues listed (like involuntary
pooling) mostly affect other operators and not the public at large.
However, there is no parallel statute listing specific circumstances under which members of the public are entitled to notice—not even for injection wells, as is required in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.245
The one instance when surface owners in Colorado do receive direct notice is when an operator files an application for
increased well density. This triggers the option of a public forum. 246 The ability to request a public forum can be contrasted
with the ability to request a hearing in front of the Commission,
as Montana statute permits. 247 The benefits to Colorado’s public
forum approach are clear. First, it is administratively simpler.
The local community is granted the opportunity to comment on
the deviation from standard well density, but the Commission
itself does not have to spend its time overseeing these proceedings (it receives a report and a record of them). 248 Second, the
parties likely to be affected by the decision are notified about the
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra text accompanying notes 142–43.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-108(4) (2016).
COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:507(b) (2016).
Id. § 404-1:507(c).
See supra Table 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 162–66.
See supra text accompanying notes 144–45.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
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public forum by personal mail three weeks in advance, with an
additional notice posted in local newspapers two weeks in advance.249 Third, not only are local citizens properly notified, but
they also do not have to travel very far to participate in the permit process. Holding public forums in the affected communities
might increase turnout and foster a more meaningful discussion
of an operator’s application.
Despite these strengths, Colorado’s approach has its drawbacks. The public forum option is only available when an operator applies to increase well density beyond what is statutorily
permissible.250 The implicit presumption is that Colorado’s restrictions on well density ensure safety—that is, if operators
abide by the current restrictions, they will pose no significant
health or safety threats to the public. But, the existence of even
one drilling unit can lead to wastewater spills or air pollution
that affect the health of nearby communities. Communities in
Colorado are not involved in the initial question—whether or not
to allow the drilling unit at all.
C. THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHO IS A MEMBER OF
STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS AGENCIES AND WHO IS NOT
Regardless of how local community members feel about a
new drilling unit, the decision of whether to grant a permit ultimately rests with the individual members of the state-level oil
and gas agencies. While they often take the public’s perspective
into consideration in the form of hearings or public forums, it is
the agency’s vote, not any public vote, that determines whether
an operator may proceed with a particular aspect of the drilling
process. For this reason, the perspectives and priorities of those
individual members can greatly affect how the oil and gas agencies approach permit requests.
This Section will compare how Montana, Colorado, and the
other states surveyed have designed and empowered their oil
and gas agencies. It first discusses why the required attributes
of the individual members are important, as well as raising the
concern that these attributes could lead to regulatory capture by
the petroleum industry. This Section then briefly assesses the
relative merits of appointing or electing board members, as well
as the relative merits of having a smaller or a larger board.

249. See supra text accompanying notes 163–64.
250. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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1. Who Has a Vote, Who Does Not, and Why It Might Matter
Montana’s statute emphasizes a balance between members
who have been affiliated with the petroleum industry (at least
three members) and those who are unaffiliated landowners (at
least two members). 251 The remaining two members are unspecified, though one of the seven members must be an attorney. 252
Conceivably, the remaining two members could also have connections to the petroleum industry. All seven members are appointed in two batches by the Governor with no restrictions on
political party affiliations. This statutory setup means that, for
the last two years of a governor’s term, the Board could be a fully
partisan entity dominated by individuals who have been affiliated with the petroleum industry. By not requiring any members
who specialize in public or environmental health, the Board
could inadvertently minimize such perspectives in the same way
that the industry itself tends to dismiss health concerns.
By contrast, Colorado’s statutory requirements create a
Commission that ensures a broader set of viewpoints. 253 The executive directors of the Department of Natural Resources and
the Department of Public Health and Environment—both of
whom have a vote—sit alongside the seven members appointed
by the Governor.254 Although three of the elected members must
be affiliated with the petroleum industry, there must also be
members with “substantial experience” in both wildlife protection and soil conservation. 255 Those members are in addition to
the two ex officio executive directors. Colorado also avoids a fully
partisan Commission by requiring that no more than four of the
appointed members be of the same party.256

251. See supra text accompanying notes 129–33.
252. Id.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50.
254. Id.
255. Id. The “substantial environmental or wildlife protection experience”
member could be an environmental lawyer rather than a scientist. See Colorado
Oil & Gas Conservation Commissioners, COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION
COMM’N, http://cogcc.state.co.us/about.html#/commissioners (last visited Oct.
13, 2017) (showing that the current member in this position is an environmental
lawyer). Similarly, Colorado’s requirement for a member with “substantial soil
conservation experience” is currently filled by someone with degrees in geology.
Id.
256. See Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commissioners, supra note 255.
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Colorado is unique among the states surveyed: no other
state requires any specific representation for public health, natural resources, soil conservation, or wildlife protection. 257 Ohio
comes closest by requiring that one of its five members represent
“the public.” 258 By contrast, Arkansas only requires that “at
least” a majority of its nine members have some kind of experience with oil and gas. 259 North Dakota does not require any oil
and gas experience for its three ex officio Commission members,
but amends this potential deficit by using a subsidiary body to
make permit decisions.260 Wyoming also has a Commission that
includes three ex officio members, but requires that its two appointed members be “qualified to serve the oil and gas industry
of the state.” 261
Compared to the other states surveyed, the statutory requirements of Colorado’s Commission result in an agency that
must assess oil and gas permit decisions in a more holistic manner. Local communities and environmental organizations could
perhaps pitch their concerns to the Commission without feeling
like it was a procedural protest. By giving public health and the
environment a seat within the agency, Colorado’s approach
likely diminishes threats to health and safety before they occur.
It also lessens the likelihood of regulatory capture.
Regulatory capture occurs when a government agency becomes, in effect, controlled by the industry that it was supposed
to be regulating. 262 On the one hand, it is clearly important that
some members who sit on oil and gas boards have a familiarity
with oil and gas production. On the other hand, by focusing exclusively on members with experience in the petroleum industry,
states run the risk of creating agencies that, in the words of the
Wyoming statute, “serve the oil and gas industry” rather than
the public.263 The potential for regulatory capture is most acute
in a state like Arkansas, where the entire nine-person commission could come from (or plan to go to) the petroleum industry. 264
257. See supra Table 1.
258. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.35(a) (2016).
259. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-71-102(b) (2017).
260. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 38-08.1-04.1(3), 54-17-01 (2017).
261. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a) (2017).
262. See Regulatory Capture, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
263. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a).
264. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 49 (2008) (“Administrators cater
to special interests not because they are locked in an exchange relationship with
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Even when revolving-door concerns are absent, the agency might
be structured in a way that implicitly leads to capture. 265 Or perhaps one interest group is supplying a disproportionate amount
of the data on which that agency relies to make regulatory decisions.266 While citizens rarely participate in regulatory decisionmaking, interest groups can routinely exert pressure on an
agency.267 Intuitively, states that require diverse oil and gas
boards (like Colorado) are better poised to combat these concerns.
What about situations where the agency has no quota for
industry representation because the members are elected rather
than appointed? How might that affect the allegiance of certain
board members? Because of the dynamic of campaign donations,
members can feel beholden to the industry. The following Subsection briefly considers this phenomenon.
2. Competing Models: Should Board Members Be Elected or
Appointed?
Of the ten states surveyed, most have charged the governor
with appointing their oil and gas board members. Certain restrictions are often placed on the governor—for example, requiring that a limited number of the members be of the same political
party, or requiring that a certain number of members have oil
legislators but rather to advance their own interests, such as favorable future
employment prospects with regulated interests.”). Similarly, lawmakers in
Idaho recently overhauled its Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to replace
“mostly citizen commissioners with three industry experts, an elected county
commissioner and the director of the Idaho Department of Lands.” Keith Ridler,
Overhaul of Idaho Oil and Gas Laws Include New Commission, U.S. NEWS (Apr.
27, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/idaho/articles/2017-04-27/
overhaul-of-idaho-oil-and-gas-laws-includes-new-commission.
265. See CROLEY, supra note 264, at 50 (“Although agency personnel are not
motivated to engage in regulatory favoritism, for structural-institutional reasons their decisions nevertheless tend to be biased in favor of special interests.”).
266. Id. (“Information biases may then translate into regulatory biases.”).
267. Id. at 21 (“For ordinary citizens, the costs of registering or even of formulating regulatory preferences far exceed the benefits. Not so for organized
interest groups. . . . Given that the benefits of regulatory goods are higher for
organized groups than for individual voters, the former enjoy much more influence in regulatory decisionmaking relative to the latter.”); see also Richard A.
Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework, in REGULATION VS. LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS & LAW
19 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011) (“Agencies are subject to far more intense interest-group pressures than courts. . . . The fact that agency members are specialized, and that they are less insulated from the political process than judges are,
makes them targets for influence by special-interest groups . . . .”).
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and gas experience. 268 North Dakota and Wyoming take a hybrid
approach: North Dakota’s three ex officio members (all elected)
delegate some powers to a division, the head of which was appointed; 269 Wyoming’s Governor is a member of its Board, along
with four appointed members (two of whom serve ex officio). 270
Oklahoma and Texas both elect their three-person commissions that oversee, among other things, the oil and gas development in those states.271 This approach abandons any particular
design (like Colorado’s carefully balanced commission) and instead places the decision directly in the hands of voters. The
question is, by electing their oil and gas board members, are the
citizens of Oklahoma and Texas somehow better off? Can an
elected oil and gas board more nimbly and adequately address
the needs of local communities?
For reasons similar to the regulatory capture analysis
above,272 the answer is likely no. Individuals running for office
must solicit campaign donations. This grants the petroleum industry an opportunity to invest in certain candidates to encourage their allegiance to the industry.273 Elected officials can even
receive substantial donations after entering office. For example,
an elected commissioner of Oklahoma’s oil and gas agency collected an additional $80,000 after his election win—“mostly from
donors in the oil and gas industry.”274 The hazards of fracking
are most acute for those living near drill and wastewater sites. 275
These affected individuals are neither as numerous nor as organized as the petroleum industry. When Oklahoma was confronted with its recent spate of unprecedented earthquakes, the

268. See, e.g., supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (describing the system in Colorado).
269. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 54-17-02 (2017); North Dakota Industrial
Commission, N.D. STATE GOV’T, http://www.nd.gov/ndic/ic-about.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
270. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103(a) (2017).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 194–99.
272. See supra notes 262–67 and accompanying text.
273. Cf. Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking 4 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 06/34, 2006) (“ The regulated firms may exercise pressure at the political level, for example, by . . . attempting to gain [politicians’]
allegiance through campaign contributions.”).
274. See Clay, supra note 196 (explaining that donors in Oklahoma may legally contribute to elected Corporation Commission members for 120 days after
the general election).
275. See supra notes 74–102 and accompanying text.

2017]

DRILLING AND COMMUNITY CONSENT

381

avowedly pro-fracking Commissioners 276 and skeptical Governor 277 were slow to acknowledge the likely link to the injection
wells. The Commissioners ultimately decided to work within the
existing laws rather than impose, say, a moratorium on
wastewater injection or enact any new regulations. 278 If elected
leaders fail to rapidly address something as glaring as the dangers of earthquakes, how can they be expected to adequately address invisible harms like air pollution?
It appears that being an elected member of an oil and gas
board does not inherently make those members more sympathetic or responsive to public health concerns. Appointed boards
are, of course, susceptible to their own problems. Governors can
use appointments to reward loyal party members (rather than
select individuals on merit alone), leading to “old boy syndrome.” 279 Even though members of appointed boards do not receive campaign contributions, such boards could still be subject
to regulatory capture. However, on balance, the appointed
boards are more insulated from the industry, which may help
them address public health concerns more effectively.
This Part assessed, first, the tension between the petroleum
industry’s interest in efficiency and the public’s interest in
health and safety. This tension is often embodied within the oil
and gas boards themselves, which can strengthen the position of
either side by adopting certain notice and comment regimes. The
particular board members, including their backgrounds and
which group’s interests they are designated to represent, will
also affect how this tension gets resolved. The final Part makes
recommendations on these matters.

276. See, e.g., Bob Anthony, Response to Attacks on Hydraulic Fracturing (A
Proven Well Completion Technology for Shale Gas), OKLA. CORP. COMM’N (Mar.
30, 2011), http://www.occeweb.com/Comm/Anthony/Woodford%20Summit
%2003302011v_final3.pdf (explaining the fracking process and why state regulation is better than EPA regulation).
277. See John Burnett, Texas, Oklahoma Divided over How To Handle
Earthquakes Linked to Oil Drilling, NPR (Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.npr.org/
2016/11/28/503632437/texas-oklahoma-divided-over-how-to-handle
-earthquakes-linked-to-oil-drilling (“ The first research linking the state’s most
important industry to the earthquake surge came out in 2013, though leaders
like Governor Mary Fallin did not embrace the science until 2015.”).
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Nancy McCarthy, Elect or Appoint Bar Board Members? For
Some, That Is the Question, CAL. B.J. (Apr. 2011), http://www.calbarjournal
.com/April2011/TopHeadlines/TH5.aspx (describing this problem in the context
of the California State Bar board of governors).
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III. LIMITING HARM BEFORE IT OCCURS: WAYS TO
STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC’S ROLE IN THE PERMIT
PROCESS
The final Part of this Note attempts to reconcile the competing interests of the petroleum industry and the public in a way
that tips the balance toward the interests of property owners and
community members. Giving nearby landowners a greater role
in the permit process would require that state-level oil and gas
agencies consider the perspective of those landowners when deciding whether to grant a permit. Because the current regulatory
regime tends to favor efficiency over transparency and public
health, this Note suggests a solution that gives the public a
stronger role.
Section A proposes that because fracking and its associated
waste products are hazardous to human and environmental
health, nearby landowners are entitled to actual notice by mail
and a public forum for all new exploratory wells outside of existing fields. Then, Section B proposes that state-level oil and gas
agencies use a modified Colorado model: they must include at
least one board member who specializes in public health, and one
board member who specializes in ecology or biology. Finally, Section C proposes that each oil and gas agency establish an epidemiological monitoring program to be implemented at petroleum
exploration fields. It should not be incumbent on individual citizens to collect data and monitor the toxic byproducts of drilling
operations near their homes.
A. AN APPLICATION FOR NEW EXPLORATORY WELLS SHOULD
MANDATE MAILED NOTICE TO NEARBY LANDOWNERS AND A
PUBLIC FORUM
Property owners and communities have a right to know
about and comment on proposed oil and gas drilling projects before they occur. The need for transparency and public involvement can be balanced against the efficiency arguments that the
petroleum industry and the oil and gas boards often make. Because any new exploratory well has the potential to become a
fully operating well and harm environmental health, Montana is
right to view such permit requests as worthy of heightened scrutiny. 280 However, its form of notice and its subsequent hearing
in front of the Board are not the best solution. Oil and gas boards
280. See supra text accompanying notes 33–73 (describing an overview of the
drilling process).
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should instead use Colorado’s public forum approach, which is
procedurally simpler but accomplishes the same goal. 281
When an oil and gas board receives a permit request for a
new exploratory well outside of an existing field, it should alert,
by direct mail, the state’s department charged with overseeing
public health and the department that oversees conservation or
wildlife issues. The board should also alert, by direct mail, an
appointed person in the county seat of the requested drilling project. If any of those three parties request a public forum in the
county seat, then a public forum will be arranged. Concurrently,
any landowners within a reasonable distance of the land on
which the well is proposed should also be directly notified with
the option to request a public forum. At a minimum, this should
include landowners who share a property line with the affected
parcel. Lastly, mandatory notice in local newspapers and the
major newspaper of that state’s capital should allow any other
interested party to request a public forum.
Next, if someone does request a public forum, then those
same nearby landowners should be notified by mail about the
forum at least three weeks in advance. Local newspapers and
the major newspaper of that state’s capital would run a notice at
least two weeks in advance. The costs incurred during both
rounds of notice should be billed to the operator requesting the
permit. Although e-mail alerts could be useful in some circumstances, e-mail would work less well for full notice requirements.
This is because, unlike landowner records and addresses, there
is not yet a local registry of each individual’s primary e-mail address. Additionally, nearly a quarter of the people living in rural
areas—the places most affected by the petroleum exploration—
still do not regularly use the Internet.282
Finally, if a public forum occurs, then the local official in
charge of the forum would produce a report to be sent to the oil
and gas agency. The report should be made public on the
agency’s website, perhaps including a full transcript and video
of the proceedings. If the proposed well is ultimately approved,
then the community will likely be more knowledgeable about its
potential health threats because of the public forum. The public
281. In Colorado, public forums are sometimes used if an application violates
well density limitations. See supra text accompanying notes 162–66.
282. Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000–
2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/
06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015 (“ Those who live in rural areas are
less likely than those in the suburbs and urban areas to use the internet. Still,
78% of rural residents are online.”).
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forum would “afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 283 Local communities cannot unilaterally prevent oil and
gas projects from showing up in their peripheries. But, these
steps will promote a more well-informed community. They will
also create a record of the specific concerns about a new drilling
location, which could be useful in future litigation.
The drawback to this plan lies in its compromise. By substituting Montana’s hearings with public forums, individuals are
no longer making arguments in front of the board itself. Instead,
their concerns are bundled into a tidy report to be perused by the
board in a distant city. An in-person discussion with the ultimate
decision-makers could make citizens’ concerns more psychologically persuasive. The plan also lessens the efficiency of the permit process by adding extra procedures. In turn, this increases
uncertainty for drillers; if their permit is finally approved, perhaps the board would tack on unpredictable and costly stipulations based on community concerns. Especially concerning for
drillers may be the ability for any interested party to request a
public forum. What if environmental organizations stymie every
single permit request with a public forum demand?
These drawbacks—for both sides—seem outweighed by the
benefits. The public forum option is only offered, as in Montana
law, when a permit is requested to drill outside of an existing
field. 284 Even if environmental organizations managed to arrange a public forum for each of those permit requests, the
stakes are not as high as during a formal hearing; the public forum will produce no final, binding decision. It is less burdensome
for locals (who do not have to travel to a board meeting to be
heard) and less burdensome for the oil and gas boards. At the
same time, locals receive the notice and the ability to comment
that are currently lacking in most states. As parties whose rights
may be affected by the drilling, they “are entitled to be heard.” 285
B. STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS AGENCIES SHOULD INCLUDE
MEMBERS WHO SPECIALIZE IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECOLOGY
When making regulatory decisions, oil and gas boards must
balance efficiency with the public interest. This balance is determined in part by the members themselves. How states decide
who is a member of such agencies and who is not will affect how
283. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43.
285. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
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that agency frames the issues that come before it. Without representation in the agency, some groups will have a much weaker
voice in the agency’s decisions than the groups that did receive
representation. The connection between the petroleum industry
and threats to public health is well documented and regularly
demonstrated. For this reason, oil and gas boards should include
representatives from those fields as permanent, voting members.
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Commission serves as
an exemplary entity in this regard. Not only are the Department
of Natural Resources and the Department of Public Health and
Environment both present on the Commission, but the appointed members must also represent specific public and environmental health needs.286 This is not redundant. By mandating
that five of the nine Commission members represent public or
environmental health, Colorado can better assess the immediate
harms associated with drilling. It is also in a better position to
make long-term decisions about what is in the state’s best interest, since, theoretically, the individuals representing public
health or the environment are less motivated by short-term economic gains and are more concerned with the far-reaching implications of today’s policies.
A problematic aspect of Colorado’s arrangement is that an
environmental lawyer can qualify as the member with “substantial environmental or wildlife protection experience.” 287 Environmental lawyers do not necessarily know much about ecology or
how ecosystems function. To better address potential environmental harms, the members representing the environment
should be trained in natural sciences. Each oil and gas board
should contain one member trained and working as an ecologist
or biologist and another trained in public health. Whether this
requirement would be filled by ex officio members of relevant
agencies, or by separate individuals, or by both (like Colorado)
would depend on each state.
This Note also recommends that: (1) oil and gas agency
members be appointed by the governor; and (2) that they require
someone “trained in geology” rather than “with experience in the
petroleum industry.” Both of these suggestions aim to minimize
the likelihood of regulatory capture. The former assures the public that the members of their state’s oil and gas board were not
286. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50.
287. See supra note 255 (noting also that the soil conservation member is
trained as a geologist).
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simply bought through industry donations and campaign contributions. The latter distinction makes clear that it is the geologic
skills and knowledge that are needed—whether those skills were
honed in the industry, in the government, or in academia.
The details of both this proposal and the former one could
be assessed by a legislative committee, or could be determined
by the oil and gas boards themselves through adequate hearing
and notice procedures. States might vary in which particular
health or environmental departments should be present on oil
and gas agencies. They might also vary in the particular scientific specialties of the appointed members, depending on what
ecosystems are most threatened by the industry in that particular state. Similarly, the precise parameters of who receives direct
notice for new exploratory permits could depend on local factors,
such as the likely fallout zone of any health risks. This could be
assessed by determining the mile range around a drilling site in
which air quality could be diminished or by examining the paths
of streamflow to estimate the exposure route of a potential surface-level wastewater spill.
C. STATE-LEVEL OIL AND GAS AGENCIES SHOULD ESTABLISH
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MONITORING PROGRAMS
Finally, oil and gas boards should adopt the epidemiological
monitoring program suggested by The Endocrine Disruption Exchange. 288 In a paper published in 2011, the organization recommended the “environmental monitoring of air and water as well
as any health changes in those living and working in regions of
natural gas operations.”289 At the very least, the enhanced notice
and comment regime proposed in this Note will allow communities to do such monitoring on their own before and after the drilling activity. But, not all communities will have the ability—or
resources—to do so. This is why all oil and gas boards should
establish their own epidemiological monitoring programs. The
boards themselves, perhaps through their public health member, would collect data on environmental and human health near
drilling operations. This data would be available to the public in
288. See Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations from a Public Health
Perspective, 17 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: AN INT’L J. 1039, 1055
(2011) (“Given the general consistency of reported adverse health effects by citizens and laborers across many gas plays, public health authorities should establish an epidemiological monitoring program . . . in order to increase power
and be able to reach conclusions early on.”).
289. Id.
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regular reports. That way, public health officials and concerned
citizens can better assess the ongoing risks posed by any particular drilling field.
Certainly, such a plan would provoke outcry: let the oil and
gas boards be in charge of issuing permits, and let the public
health and environmental agencies be in charge of regulation.
That fragmented approach has not been working in most states.
Public health and environmental agencies must mitigate harms
that have already occurred. It is time to bring fracking-related
public health problems to the fore and put the onus for their
oversight where it belongs: with the initial permitting bodies.
CONCLUSION
The ability to frack the natural gas out of tight shale formations has certainly been a boon for energy independence in
the United States and for the petroleum industry. However, the
drilling process and its associated wastewater pose health and
safety risks to humans living nearby and to the environment at
large. Depending on which state they live in, landowners could
wake up to a drilling operation on the other side of their property
line without receiving any notice and without ever having an opportunity to voice their concerns.
When designing their oil and gas boards, states attempt to
balance the interests of the industry and local communities. But,
they often fall short of protecting public health. Because of the
documented health risks that the oil and gas industry poses to
humans and the environment at large, state legislatures should
modify their oil and gas boards. By mandating that a public
health specialist and ecologist sit in those agencies, and by mandating that the boards monitor oil and gas pollution for epidemiological threats, the health of local communities and ecosystems
would no longer be an afterthought. In turn, the public should
be equipped with a stronger notice and comment regime. These
suggestions will not ensure that a community has given its full,
informed consent to any particular drilling project. But, by shifting the emphasis to public and environmental health, oil and gas
boards can help preempt harm.
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Arkansas

Y 290

N 291

N 292

Y 293

9 294

N 295

Colorado

Y 296

Nearby Landowners 297 or
Upon Request 298

N 299

Y 300

9 301

Y 302

Montana

Y 303

Y 304

Upon Request 305

N 306

7 307

N 308

290. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-203(a) (2017).
291. Id. § 15-72-203(c)(4) (“After written notice of the operator’s intent to
begin shale operations is given under this subsection, an operator is not required to give any other notice . . . .”).
292. See id. § 15-72-203.
293. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N, GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, GENERAL
RULE H 192–214 (2016), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/rules/rulesregs.pdf.
294. Id. § 15-71-102(a)–(b).
295. Id.
296. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:305.c(1) (2017).
297. Id.
298. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-108(5) (2016).
299. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:305.
300. COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:325.j, :325.n.
301. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a)(I).
302. Id.
303. ENVTL. QUALITY COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO SPLIT ESTATES IN OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT 2 (2013), http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/environmental/
hb790brochure.pdf.
304. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.601(1), 36.22.620(2) (2017).
305. Id. at 36.22.601(4).
306. See id. at 36.22.1403.
307. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-3303(2) (2015).
308. Id.
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New York

Y 309

N 310

N 311

Y 312

N/A 313

N 314

North
Dakota

Y 315

Nearby Landowners 316

N 317

Y 318

3 319

N 320

Ohio

Y 321

Nearby Urban Landowners 322

N 323

N 324

5 325

N 326

309. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (McKinney) at ¶ 13.
310. “Public hearings are held when there is dispute about the spacing units
for a formation or if the entire mineral property to be affected by the project is
not contractually under the control of the applicant. This is not typical in NY;
however, in these cases, a notice is posted to the ENB [Environmental Notice
Bulletin].” Email from a civil servant, N.Y. Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting &
Mgmt., Div. of Mineral Res., to author (Mar. 9, 2017, 15:25 CST) (on file with
author).
311. Id.
312. The EPA has full oversight of New York’s underground injection program. See Primary Enforcement Authority for the Underground Injection, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/uic/primary-enforcement-authority-underground-injection
-control-program (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). It publishes notice of proposed permits on its website. See Underground Injection Control in EPA Region 2, (NJ,
NY, PR, and VI), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/uic/underground-injection-control
-epa-region-2-nj-ny-pr-and-vi (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
313. See Division of Mineral Resources, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/636.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). The Division of Mineral Resources has three offices handling oil and gas drilling permits, with ten people working on permits. E-mail from C. Scott Dietzel, Mineral
Res. Specialist 2, N.Y. Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting & Mgmt., Div. of Mineral
Res., to author (Mar. 10, 2017, 08:26 CST) (on file with author).
314. E-mail from Thomas E. Noll, Dir., N.Y. Bureau of Oil & Gas Permitting
& Mgmt., Div. of Mineral Res., to author (Mar. 17, 2017, 09:35 CDT) (on file
with author).
315. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08.1-04.1(4) (2017).
316. Id.
317. See id. §§ 38-08.1-04, -04.1.
318. N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-05-04(1) (2017) (“No underground injection
may be conducted without obtaining a permit from the commission after notice
and hearing.”).
319. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-17-02.
320. Id.
321. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.06(A)(9) (2017).
322. Id. §§ 1509.06(A)(9), .60.
323. See id. § 1509.06.
324. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3745-34-12 (2016).
325. OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.35(A).
326. Id.
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Oklahoma

Y 327

N 328

N 329

Y 330

3 331

N 332

Pennsylvania

Y 333

Nearby Landowners 334

N 335

Y 336

N/A 337

N 338

Texas

Y 339

N 340

N 341

Y 342

3 343

N 344

Wyoming

Y 345

N 346

N 347

N 348

5 349

N 350

327. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-1(g) (2016).
328. See id. § 165:10-3-1.
329. See id.
330. Id. § 165:10-5-5(d).
331. See OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, http://www.occeweb.com/index.html.
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